

Crisis

CRISIS NOTED

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See Henry Cabot Lodge article in Jan 1956
on Suez/Hungary ('Nixon?')

Murphy article Fortune Jan '57 on Suez-Hungary
(good links)

see Lippman 4 Nov 1956

W Hitchcock, Denning
Bissell, Sommerfeldt, Hilman

Hypo:

Sommerfeldt: Linking of crises; effects of crises
on expectations of others:

Cuba — Cuban fishing boats (see ^{as} organized plot) ^{provocation}
Berlin '48 — 1958-61-63.

↓
(Active consideration of help to our uprising in
Poland,

Housing DOD
OX-74115

River House 524-2200
1400 ^{S. Joyce} JA-47900

Center

Moratorium:

1) Look at problems of communicating with SU in crises (perhaps initiated by us) where they (we?) are not directly involved; where the problem of "limiting" is the problem of keeping SU out.

2) Examine Far East crises where, if we can keep SU out, our "massive strength" can be really plausible & effective — vs. Chicomos.

e.g. consider demonstrations against the Chicomos. If SU can be kept out.

(Page: close passes in Himalayas, without loss of life. (actually proposed?))

How would we convey impression that we believe SU will stay out? (Without taking public stand that forces SU — in face of satellites — to commit itself strongly.

e.g. ignore SU verbal commitment in making our threats — without publicly questioning their statements.

Moorstein:

- 3) The more prior agreements with SU, or desires of them, the more bargaining power we have to keep SU out; a major significance of Sino-Sov split that this can be objective (& threat, to Sov).
- 4) Among audiences for our statements, now count the Eastern European satellites.
- 5) How to take action against China, or threaten, without driving them back into Alliance.
e.g. direct attack on their nuc plants might drive them into SU arms. (Might offer Sovs joint control of nuc, strategy).
- 6) A Sov. claimed that in Quemoy-Matzen, Sov Jinn Min

Chuck Sheehan, MITRE (Paint; info
requirements in GW).

Dave McCann, O/A Production Center
(under Col. Ark): (info-handling system
for O/A).

See 184 report on info available to CIIIC:
Current Intelligence Information Center

Flitner:

Importance in crisis of dealing with
opposite decision-makers as individuals: of knowing
their perceptions (e.g. relative weights attached to
"objective factors," calculations, various goals...)

CRISES.

Lessons from Salsgirth:

- 1) Efficient control actions are based on "feel": implicit, "intuitive": operator can't say just what signals he is responding to, why they lead him to certain actions, or what his actions are, entirely or in detail (can't necessarily say which way he turns knobs to move ball in particular direction, or even which knob — let alone timing, speed, duration of tilt, sequence, coordination).
- 2) Immediate feedback of results; chance for fast repetition, trial; errors not fatal.
- 3) Increasing smoothness of control — but earlier jiggling essential to learning.
- 4) To minimize control actions, use the momentum of ball when it is seen to be going 'about right' as a result of repulsions, etc — don't 'interfere' (e.g. to 'get credit!')